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THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT*
EDGAR

S. GORRELLt

Democracy stumbles and muddles. It is too slow for the man
on horseback.
But now and then it takes a great stride forward to catch up
with the times. Those strides confound its critics.
During the last session of Congress our democracy took one of
those strides when it adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act.
To us in aeronautics that Act means much. But it may prove
of even deeper significance to the nation at large. For it represents
the first attempt'by Congress to meet and master a fateful problem
of modern democratic government.
Mr. Justice Stone has stated that the most striking recent
change in our legal structure has been the rise of a system of administrative law. For a half century the federal and state governments
have been adopting isolated measures which vest in administrative
agencies combined legislative, judicial and executive functions. This
union of functions would no doubt have shocked the Constitution
makers. But the insistent demands of civilized life in a machine
age have spoken louder than voices from the grave. The sharp
impact of the facts of life has shaped to new lines our ancient
theory of the separation of powers.
While these new lines of constitutional doctrine have by no
means destroyed, or even impaired, the liberty which it is the design
of separated powers to secure, they have permitted the appearance
of certain tendencies which, if pursued, might become dangerous.
Notable is the tendency to make the same person both prosecutor
and judge. Notable also is the tendency so to burden the judicial
officers of an administrative agency with duties of an executive
nature that the efficiency of those officers is threatened.
The fear that these tendencies would develop has led many
eminent gentlemen vigorously to oppose the creation of administrative agencies of government. This opposition has, at times, verged
upon hysterics. There are those who have insisted that we return
*Address presented at the Eighth Annual Convention of the National Association of State Aviation Officials, October 13-15, 1938.
t President. Air Transport Association of America.
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to the conceptions of a simple society and transfer to the courts
the judicial functions now vested in administrative bodies.
Such reaction would plunge us into hopeless confusion. Imagine
if you can where aeronautics would be twenty years hence if there
were no speedy administrative instruments for determining disputes
and securing compliance with law. Under such circumstances aeronautics would be grounded in twisted wreckage.
The suggestions of extreme reaction should not, however, obscure the grievances which they represent. Let us examine those
grievances more closely.
The tendency to make the same agency both prosecutor and
judge quite properly evokes protest. Where the legislature simply
creates an administrative agency charged with the regulation of an
industry or of certain practices, without making provision for the
separation of judicial and prosecuting functions, it is easy for the
two to become blended. Administrative bodies have made notable
efforts to avoid this union and the courts have elaborated rules of
procedure designed to the same end. But even the familiar device,
adopted by some agencies, of proceeding by an examiner's hearing,
with proposed findings and argument on exceptions thereto, has
not altogether avoided the difficulty. Too often we find that the
same person in an agency institute a cAse, prepare it for presentation, and then act as advisors to the administrative tribunal when
it is finally decided. Where this occurs it requires a profoundly
judicial temperament to advise without preconception.
The tendency to saddle executive duties upon administrative
officers also presents a serious problem. This tendency springs
not so much from the necessities of our machine age as from our
Anglo-Saxon propensity to deal with problems one at a time as
they arise. Upon only a few occasions in our history have we
sought to anticipate problems by the laying down of general rules.
Most of the time we eschew general rules, simply pouncing upon
individual questions and dealing with them with no particular relation to other issues or to broad implications for the future.
As Dean Landis of the Harvard Law School recently said:
"The administrative agency came into being not as a single, comprehensive, philosophical conception but by a process of empirical growth. These
agencies have always sprung from a concern over things rather than' over
doctrine."

This has resulted in the creation of a maze of agencies with
the most- bewilderingly different kinds of powers. An agency once
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created is vested first with one power and then with another until
through the years the process of accretion produces a veritable
potpourri of governmental functions, the administration of which
would challenge the ingenuity of a Pooh Bah.
The dangers of this development are patent. Chief among
them is the fact that the officer charged with the task of determining rights and obligations between man and man and between man
and society may likewise be burdened with so much administrative
detail that he finds it impossible to maintain the atmosphere of
detachment which is indispensable to judicial action. Equally serious is the danger that the agency will be forced to divide its duties
among its members, with the possibility of creating the confusion
which comes from the right hand's ignorance of the left hand's
behavior. Finally there is the very real fact that human beings
have limited capacities, and dissipation of their energies is a fatal
blow at the quality of their labor.
I have referred to tendencies, and I want to be understood as
meaning nothing more. I do not join those who protest that our
governmental agencies have broken down or have been transformed
into instruments of tyranny. I mean only that we have reached a
point where dangers lurk if we continue blindly to bestow variant
powers upon administrative bodies. I mean only that the warning
signs are out and our democracy will do well to heed them.
There is an additional factor which complicates the problem of
government through administrative bodies and which makes it of
particular importance that we take stock of our governmental
methods.
Hitherto, when we have approached questions of governmental
regulation, we have thought largely in terms of protecting the public
from abuse of economic power in private hands. Until very recent
years we have thought of government almost altogether as a policeman, whose duty was done when it had swung its club upon the
skulls of malefactors.
For example, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was conceived in the belief that the power of the railroads required bridling
in order to safeguard the interests of shippers. The need for government to take a hand in conserving and planning the development
of our railroad resources found no clear expression in legislation
until 1920, and then only modestly.
It is true that in certain restricted channels-such as lighthouse building and road building and the provision of a postal sys-
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tem-government has gone beyond the policeman's role to an important extent. But generally speaking government's relation to
industry has been regarded as that of the policeman on the beat.
That government should accept as a portion of its regular responsibility the function of assisting industry, and even assuming
leadership, in the solution of industry's economic problems, would
have seemed preposterous a few years ago. Thus when we created
a Department of Commerce we felt that government had done its
part when it was provided that the Department should
" ... foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the
mining, manufacturing, shipping, and fishery industries, and the transportion
facilities of the United States . . .-

However, we are now aware that such a broad statement does
.not come to grips with the economic ills besetting many of our
industries today. It is necessary for government to deal more
specifically with economic diseases, the symptoms of which are idle
plants rather than exploitation of the public.
To some extent government has already begun to respond to
this need. The NIRA and the Bituminous Coal Act have given us
examples of this response. But, particularly in the NIRA, the
emphasis was largely upon the so-called chisler or cut-throat. This
is important, but even with no chiselling there would still be basic
and challenging problems which call for the cooperation and aid
of the government.
To illustrate, I quote from the recent report to the President,
submitted by the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
upon the critical condition of the railroads:
"In recent years there has been a great and radical change in transporta•tion conditions, brought about principally by the rapid development of new

forms of transportation, not all of which are subject to the (Interstate
Commerce) Commission's jurisdiction. The railroads have lost much of their
former dominance. Competition has become a continually increasing, and
often a profoundly disturbing, factor. JThe present 'transportation problem'

is very largely the product of that competition, combined with depression.
It has created need for readjustments between and within the different
branches of the transportation industry, for consideration of present tendencies
and their probable results, for the avoidance of uneconomic and wasteful
practices, for the survey and possible amendment of govermental policies, and

in general for the determination, creation, and protection of the conditions
most favorable to the development of a transportation system which will
best serve the public interest. Much of this is planning and promotional
work, as distinguished from regulation.
1.

32 Stat. 826; 5 U. S. C. §596.
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"In view of the multitude of conflicting interests among those engaged in
transportation, we believe that it is necessary for the Government to take
the lead in this planning and promotional work.

Probably the need has long

existed, but it has been vastly intensified by the recent great change in
conditions."

2

The transportation problem is not the only one upon which
government will probably advance in our lifetime with a
new set of tools and with purposes differing vitally from those
which have motivated the more traditional type of regulation. If,
when government assumes these new functions, it simply vests new
powers in the administrative agency as we have known it, our governmental machinery will approach a breakdown. As I have said,
there is already a tendency to bestow all sorts of varied functions
upon the administrative agency which impair its efficiency as a
judicial body, a tendency which even now calls for reappraisal of
our machinery of government. If we further complicate the situation by plunging administrative bodies, as presently organized, into
a new realm of planning and promotion we will have taken a fatal
step.
The report to the President to which I have just referred had
this to say of the ability of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to handle the new governmental activity which was recommended:
"The Commission, however, is not suited to the purpose. It was constituted for an essentially different purpose. Its methods and organization
were designed for regulatory work requiring quasi-judicial procedure. We
believe that planning and promotion are separate and distinct from regulation, can be separately pursued without interference, and require unlike
2
procedures and methods."

To sum up, there is a problem developing respecting administrative machinery which has three aspects:
1. There is a tendency unduly to blend the function of judge
and prosecutor.
2. There is a tendency to weigh down the members of administrative commissions with varied duties of an executive nature.
3. We are on the threshold of a new departure in governmental activity which the traditional judicial type of administrative
body is not suited to handle.
The importance of meeting, this problem is manifest. Chief
Justice Hughes recently commented upon the function of the regulatory commission, stating that the spirit which should animate its
action
2.

House Doc. No. 583, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. at p. 84.
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"must be the spirit of the just judge,"

and that it will succeed only to the extent that it performs its work
"with the recognized responsibility which attaches to judges and with the
s
impartiality and independence which is associated with the judicial office."

For the judicial-or, more properly, the quasi-judicial--officers of
administrative agencies to be able to discharge their functions in
this spirit, they must be able to act as judges and should not be
compelled to become likewise the prosecuting attorney, the chief of
police, the supreme economic council, and the governmental jackof-all-trades.
At the outset I said that the significance of the Civil Aeronautics Act was not confined to aeronautics. The reason is that
in that Act Congress has explicitly recognized, almost- for the first
time, and has sought to deal with, in a preliminary way, these problems of administrative government.
In adopting legislation for civil aeronautics, Congress faced a
situation almost without parallel.
In the first place, the industry embraces not only commercial
carriers but almost all other civil fliers. In the second place, the
industry covers not only domestic commerce but also commerce with
foreign countries in aircraft under both our flag and the flags of
other nations. In the third place, the problems of the industry involve matters both of economics and of safety, intimately interrelated and of equal importance. In the fourth place, the industry,
despite its present relatively modest size, is of peculiar significance
to basic national interests in both our peace-time and war-time life.
Finally, and this is of first importance, the need for legislation
springs not at all from a need to protect the public from exploitation but rather from the need to assure to the industry itself opportunity for vigorous growth. The familiar reasons for regulation
of other industries in the past, notably the need to assure that the
public be protected from exorbitant rates and discriminatory practices, would not in this case have prompted a solitary vote in
Congress.
The task of Congress in framing the Civil Aeronautics Act
was, then, to deal with a subject matter the scope and variety of
which cannot be matched in the case of any other industry, with
ends in view altogether different from the ends with which regulation has normally been concerned. Obviously, Congress would have
invited trouble had it simply provided for an independent com3. Address before American Law Institute, May 12, 1938, as reported in
N. Y. Times of May 13, 1938.
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mission, equipped with a number of powers to deal with the civil
aeronautics industry. Planning, prompting, regulating, experimenting, studying, policing-a cluster of powers to secure the accomplishment of all that was necessary would have presented a new
record of confusion.
Happily Congress took steps to avoid this impasse.
The steps are four in number.
(1) The first will be disclosed in sections 201 (b) and 301 to
307 of the Act. These sections provide that in addition to an independent Authority there shall be an Administrator responsible
directly to the President, whose duty it will be to undertake the
promoting of civil aeronautics, to provide for the establishment
and maintenance of airways and landing fields whereby air commerce can operate, and to engage in development work. These
duties are not suited either to judicial officers or to a board, but
should properly be discharged by one man in a position to work
closely and without embarrassment with other executive agencies.
The particular allocation of functions to the Administrator may
or may not be sufficiently exhaustive, but the recognition by Congress
that these matters of an executive nature ought to be handled by
an executive officer is a far-reaching and important precedent.
(2) The second step taken by Congress is disclosed in section 308 of the Act. This section provides that the Authority may
assign to the Administrator powers and duties other than those
specifically vested in him by the Act. In the statement of the House
Managers on the Conference Report it was said that under this
section the Authority could assign to the Administrator "the executive duties which are incidental to the exercise of the quasi-legis4
lative and quasi-judicial powers" conferred upon the Authority.
The Authority will thus be able to make use of the Administrator
so as to relieve its members of much administrative detail, and .to
promote coordination in the extraordinary varied work of the
agency. Likewise it may be that through appropriate use of the
Administrator the Authority will be able to avoid the undue union
of judge and prosecutor. The opportunity offered by this device
is as happy as it is unusual, and it may well be that through its
wise use the Authority will be able once and for all to answer the
polemics that have so frequently been directed at our administrative
machinery.
(3)
The third step taken by Congress is to provide, in Title
4.

House Rep. No. 2635, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., at p. 67.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

VII, for a Safety Board charged With the duty of investigating
accidents and making recommendations for improved safety measures. Through this Board the Authority will be able to secure
criticism of its own work in a forthright manner which would be
otherwise impossible. At the same time the Authority will be free
of the responsibility-which should not belong to it-of investigating accidents and engaging in the studies incidental to the Safety
Board's work. The Board, on the other hand, is not permitted
under the law to exercise any of the regulatory or promotional
functions so that it will not be placed in the untenable position of
passing judgment upon its own work. It will stand apart, to examine coldly and dispassionately, without embarrassment, fear or
favor, the results of the work of other people. In the Safety Board
the Congress has established a truly academic agency, but it is
academic with an intensely practical purpose: to discover what is
wrong, and to suggest how the Authority and the Administrator
can right wrongs. Thus Congress has recognized the virtue of
providing a regularly established medium for self-criticism in government and has at the same time avoided the danger of imposing
upon an administrative body essentially contradictory functions.
(4) Finally, by Sections 412 and 414 of the Act, Congress has
established the means for simplifying the Authority's task both in
the immediate and distant future. In these sections it is provided
that when agreements between carriers are approved by the Authority the execution of those agreements will be free of the anti-trust
laws. By this conditional exemption from the anti-trust laws the
industry is given a chance to govern itself, to eliminate abuses, to
conserve its resources, and to forestall the necessity of further governmental regulation. The Authority, on its part, is to see that no
oppressive or unreasonably discriminatory agreements are permitted.
If the industry and the Authority make wise use of the privileges
thus bestowed by Congress, we may have found a way to escape
the growing danger of bureaucracy which each year threatens more
seriously the success of our administrative machinery.
These features of the new Civil Aeronautics Act help to explain the unusual fact that the industry welcomed adoption of the
legislation. The industry saw in the Act promise of the advantages of sane and orderly democratic government with the opportunity of avoiding many of the dangers which hitherto have been
thought inevitable incidents of so-called governmental interference.
With a clear indication by Congress that it expects of the new
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agency a fresh approach to the difficult problem of administration
which I have tried to describe, the industry feels that it is justified
in anticipating with some confidence a regime'of efficiency, dispatch and impartiality which will prove a model.
The importance to the industry that its hopes be realized is
obvious enough. In aeronautics expenses are enormous, and they
must always be so because of the necessity for taking every possible measure to assure safety. If to the cost of day-to-day business there were to be added the incalculable expense caused by
governmental red tape and delays and hasty judgments, the industry
would face a dark future. If it were to prove necessary for every
carrier to have constantly on hand lawyers and representatives to
dog the footsteps of the Authority in order to see that things are
done, if it were to prove necessary to spend hours of time in filling
out forms and in seeking permits and approvals and authorizations,
if it were to prove necessary constantly to revise practices and
methods and to re-educate personnel in order to conform to multiplying regulations, then indeed this industry would have misplaced
its confidence. But there is no reason to believe that any such
fate is in store for us. For Congress has provided ample means
for securing an administrative machinery which will rival the
vaunted efficiency of private business.
In thus declaring my faith that democratic government can
and will operate well and efficiently, I do not mean to leave the
impression that I expect government to perform industry's own
job. "Public regulation," the Interstate Commerce Commission recently said, "is necessarily an interference with management, but
it is not management . . ."I A thorough appreciation of the implications of that statement is the only guarantee we have of maintaining a system of free enterprise.
My lawyer friends tell me that when a court passes upon the
validity of the regulations or orders of an administrative body it
ordinarily asks this questiorn: Did that body have any reasonable
basis for taking the action? In other words, the court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body. It will
interfere only if there is no possible justification for the administrative action, no matter what might be the court's own views of
what it would have done had it been taking the action in the first
instance.
An administrative body bears a relation to private management which, in a very real sense, is similar to the relation between
6. 51st Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, at p. 9.
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a court and the administrative body. It is an administrative court,
passing upon the validity of the decisions made by management
in attempting to comply with the statutory duties laid down by
Congress. And it should not penalize management, or interfere with
its decisions, unless it finds that the decisions which management
has made cannot be upheld by any reasonable view of the factseven though hindsight may disclose those decisions to have been
unwise and even though the administrative body may feel that it
would have acted differently had it been standing in management's
place.
In short, just as a healthy self-restraint must be exercised by
courts in passing upon the validity of administrative law is to work
at all, so administrative bodies must exercise self-restraint in passing upon the propriety of the conduct of management if our system
of free enterprise and individual initiative is to be preserved. "Public regulation . . . is not management . ' " Upon diligent adherence to this principle rests hope of working out the problems of
industry in a day when governmental participation in the affairs
of business is necessarily increasing.
Therefore when I say that we may anticipate a new era of governmental activity and leadership, marked not only by regulation
but also by a greater degree of planning and promotional work,
and that the pressing problem of our democracy is to provide administrative machinery which will operate fairly and efficiently in a
business-like way, I do not mean that I expect our democratic state
to do the work of industry. There remains for industry, so long
as our system endures, its own task to be done by it and it aloneand the prerogative of performing that job should be as jealously
guarded as the Bill of Rights.
Through the administrative agency government provides the
medium for a partnership with industry in the one enterprise which
commands the unswerving devotion of all of us-the public service.
Each partner has his own appointed function. In the Civil Aeronautics Act the Congress has made a new effort to facilitate the
operation of that partnership by making it possible for government
to keep abreast of the new duties and burdens of the modern era
with a more efficient machinery. The Civil Aeronautics Authority,
we may be sure, will put that machinery into operation in the spirit
which motivated Congress. We may be equally sure that the other
partner, the civil aeronautics industry, will rise to the occasion.
In the successful administration of this Act, and in the growth and
development of this industry, we shall not fail.

